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ABSTRACT 
Neo-institutional logics for the early adoption of innovations are often argued as more authentic than for 
late adopters. To what extent might this be so in relation to corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR)? 
We specifically focus on neo-institutionalist perspectives with an emphasis on isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) to illustrate alternative motivations, and verify our hypotheses using a mixed methods 
approach (survey data and field evidence from five organizations). We find that the rationale for early 
reporters entails a financial pragmatism that is absent in current debates surrounding corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). We also show that normative and coercive isomorphism interplay among early 
adopters to drive their adoption decision over time, and these facilitate the generation of different strategic 
postures to placate key external stakeholders. This contrasts with prior studies that have mainly argued for 
mimetic and normative isomorphism to dominate the decision to implement CSRR amongst adopters. 
Finally, we argue that late reporters choose not to engage earlier as (ironically) their strategic proximity to 
the phenomena being reported is intrinsically close, meaning most internal and external stakeholders 
assume the proper functioning of the phenomena being reported, and therefore do not demand it. This 
rationale for mimetic isomorphism is unique and its narrative more positive than that normally ascribed to 
it in the prior literature. Firms are subsequently less inclined to opportunistically validate or signal their 
sustainability ethos using formal reporting systems, and only do so superficially to engage in practices 
similar to other organizations in their industry or broader economy as a norm.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Balancing financial performance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a challenge for most 
enterprises.  Companies inevitably marshal different logics for engaging in any reporting practice. 
Theoretical perspectives surrounding organizational motivations for corporate social responsibility reporting 
(CSRR) 1 are therefore varied, reflecting their different strategic rationales. We investigate these motivations 
for early reporters and later reporters, noting how they affect organizational outcomes associated with 
CSRR.   
Further, there exists much literature regarding early versus late adopters in the innovation adoption 
literature.  The logic surrounding the early adoption of innovations is often argued as being more authentic 
than that of the late adopter. To what extent might this be so in relation to CSR? We specifically focus on 
neo-institutionalist perspectives that illustrate alternative motivations, and verify our hypotheses using 
qualitative interview based data as well as survey evidence. We find that the theoretical rationale for early 
reporters reveals a financial pragmatism that is absent in current debates surrounding CSR. Companies 
leading in CSRR may not engage in sustainability practices as effectively, and companies lagging in CSRR may 
be conducting sustainability practices with greater depth than their CSR imitating counterparts.  Traditional 
mimetic isomorphism subscribes that later adopters do so in order to adopt a less risky posture, following 
the paths trodden by contemporaries that assumed larger risks (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  We introduce 
alternative theoretical possibilities.   
The Finnish corporate setting is ideal for purposes of studying voluntary CSRR.  In 2013, CSR reports were 
published across a total of 180 countries, of which organizations in 130 countries considered CSR a 
mandatory reporting requirement (UNEP et al., 2013, p.9). In many of the 130 countries, only state-owned 
enterprises (e.g. India, Sweden), stock-listed companies (e.g. the UK) or large companies (e.g. Denmark) are 
required to report. An increase in mandatory sector-specific reporting, for the extractive, mining, and 
financial sectors seems apparent.  Although a number of governments have stimulated this kind of 
disclosure directly or indirectly (see e.g. Kolk, 2003), corporate social responsibility reporting has been a 
mostly voluntary activity oriented at giving accounts of the societal and environmental implications of doing 
business to external stakeholders.   
Our study is also motivated by the paucity of research on the consequences of corporate practices that 
purport to yield sustainability outcomes (Geva 2008). These impacts are difficult to identify as they arise 
indirectly and with an unspecified time lag that can span multiple years (Weber 2008). Motivated by the 
contrasting findings in the literature regarding CSRR motivations and their effects, we examine which drivers 
motivate firms to engage in voluntary CSRR and how CSR engagement impacts these organizations. To 
examine this, it is first essential to understand the initial motivation for CSRR and subsequently assess its 
consequences.  
                                                          
1
 In the previous literature, sustainability issues have been expressed by using various definitions (van Marrewijk, 2003). We use the 
term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) while the previous literature uses corporate sustainability, corporate social concern, 
corporate conscience, corporate citizenship and sustainable responsible business analogously. The principal intent of Corporate 
Social Responsibility Reporting (CSRR) is to provide information about the economic, environmental and social performance of an 
organization which aligns with the notion of triple bottom line reporting (see van Marrewijk, 2003; Hedberg and von Malmborg, 
2003; Aras and Crowther, 2009; and Ballou, et al 2006, among others).  
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Our study is based on a mixed methods approach, combining a field study of five organizations and survey 
data combining questionnaire responses from eighty organizations. Interviews were undertaken at 
organizations completing the survey, with state-owned and other companies (listed and non-listed), a 
regulator, auditors and investors comprising the sample. We therefore provide quantitative evidence for our 
hypotheses and also qualitative data clarifying our survey findings. 
Following is a review of the institutional context surrounding voluntary reporting and CSRR diffusion, 
including a brief consideration of broader diffusion theory and its implications for CSRR. We then present 
our hypotheses, research methods, findings, and finally conclude the paper with a discussion of the study’s 
limitations and as well as suggestions for future research. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF VOLUNTARY CSRR 
Studies around voluntary reporting have yielded a host of motivations for the same.  Within the financial 
reporting space, rationales for voluntary disclosures have been extensively studied, revealing the removal of 
information asymmetry as a key driver (Healy and Palepu 2001).  By releasing information voluntarily, 
organizations placate key stakeholders, providing relevant information that influences the decision making 
processes of other stakeholders. In this way, reports might be generated in response to external stakeholder 
pressures, for example regulators, suppliers, customers and broader society (Sinclair-Desgagne and Gozlan 
2003).  Alternatively voluntary disclosure might be used as a signalling mechanism, indicating a firm with 
“nothing to hide”, avoiding an adverse market reaction (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006) that might have 
eventuated from non-disclosure.   
Since the publication of the first separate environmental reports in the 1980s, the number of companies 
that publish information on their environmental, social or sustainability policies and the impacts of CSR 
have increased substantially. In addition to the volume of CSR practices engaged in, there is a clear 
tendency to include more performance measures in reports, driven by demands to assess companies’ 
results, rather than their policies (Kolk 2004). Furthermore, organizations now more extensively 
communicate their CSR efforts in the annual report, which increases accountants’ input into this function. 
Compared to traditional financial reporting practices, CSRR is uniquely different in that companies 
discretionarily choose the indicators they want to publish and the extent to which these indicators are 
reported. Second, companies have choice in obtaining an assurance service from an outside company 
(usually a Big-4 Audit Company) to attest their sustainability practices, and frame the parameters for the 
extent of assurance work done (e.g. quantitative numbers only vs. all information in the report; numbers 
from home country only vs. numbers across the global organization). CSRR is therefore a largely voluntary 
practice, compared to the more rigorous and heavily regulated financial reporting in organizations. 
Earlier studies have tried to understand why organizations undertake corporate social responsibility 
reporting and what drives them to report on sustainability for their stakeholders (Adams 2002; Bebbington 
et al. 2009). Within this stream of research, CSRR has been found to be one channel through which 
companies communicate their sustainable activities and developments to stakeholders (Kuisma et al. 2013). 
Earlier studies have also indicated that CSRR has been viewed as a company image issue and organizations 
have used it for advertisement and brand creation purposes (Branco and Rodrigues 2006; UN 2010; Bronn 
and Vidaver-Cohen 2009; Popoli 2011). It has been argued that this voluntary reporting activity follows an 
earlier trend of companies including environmental disclosures in their annual reports. This is an activity 
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that has been seen as a way for companies to manage public impressions of the organization’s operations to 
establish or maintain organizational legitimacy (Hedberg and von Malmborg 2003). We now discuss the 
varying attributes associated with early and late CSRR users, to better understand the motivations for CSRR 
adoption. 
 
Early vs. late innovation adopters 
Early adopters are traditionally thought to pursue a strategic position at the higher band of a risk-return 
relation (Tan 2001). These institutions seek to identify competitive advantage from accomplishing an 
activity that its competitors are unaware of or unwilling to partake in, with a view to saving costs or earning 
abnormal profits by leveraging an innovation that piques customer interest and raises the demand curve of 
the concerned firm.  Early innovators might typically be organizations protecting their dominant position in 
a market (Chandy and Tellis 2000; Leifer 2000), with ample resources and sufficient scale to construct a 
portfolio of low, medium and high risk strategies.  Early innovators might also be organizations striving to be 
the number one player, therefore taking a risk and adopting innovative behaviors to capture new markets 
prior to their larger or more profitable market leading competitors (O’Connor and DeMartino 2006). 
Early innovators focus on providing a point of departure from the same activities offered by its competitors 
(Garcia and Calantone 2002).  They intend to be seen as unique in their product/service offering, providing 
a non-duplicated offering that is perceived as valued by customers. Indeed, parallels have long been drawn 
between firms pursuing a differentiation strategy and the decision to conduct early, high risk radical 
innovations (Ettlie et al. 1984).   
In addition to thwarting competitors, early innovators are sometimes forced to engage in an innovation 
owing to external pressures (Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Sheremata 2000). The engagement with CSRR 
allows for organizations to extract positive social capital (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006; Patten 1992) from 
key external parties such as customers, suppliers and regulators.   The strong uptake of CSRR amongst 
mining companies globally is indicative of this rationale (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004). This consequently, 
and additionally, allows early reporters the possibility to construct self-reporting systems that seek to 
portray the organization’s position in a positive light, as opposed to  enforced regulatory environmental 
reporting systems that do otherwise (Cho and Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002).      
Late innovation adopters, by contrast, adopt a lower risk perspective – cautiously noting an innovation’s 
impact on the performance of related companies, prior to engaging with the innovation (Ali 1994). Late 
adopters therefore do not benefit from the returns accrued by an early adopter (Kapur 1995), as their 
adoption usually captures the residual customer market from a revenue perspective. From a cost 
perspective, however, late adopters might avoid the learning pitfalls of early adopters (Arndt 1967), not 
incurring the arguably greater learning costs associated to early adopters (Henderson 1993).   
Late adopters also adopt an innovation in order to be seen to be maintaining the standards constructed by 
leading industry players.  Their competitive advantage arises from their ability to execute an adoption at a 
level of efficiency and margin that at least matches their early adopting counterparts (Damanpour and 
Gopalakrishnan 2001).  In doing so, late adopters might be more likely to engage in the same adoptions to 
satisfy the perceptions of key stakeholders (customers, suppliers, etc.) whose intention is that the late 
adopter engages with the innovation in question (Westphal et al. 1997).  Finally, late adopters are generally 
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proxied to be less aligned with the strategic attributes associated to the use of an innovation, owing to their 
decision not to adopt early. 
 
Neo-Institutionalism and Innovation Adoption 
Neo-institutionalism begins with the premise that organizational actions are driven by patterns of rational-
ised activity (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000), where socially desirable norms are translated into technical 
attributes that drive the way formal organizations work.  Modern institutions comprise socially aligned 
practices that are “…thoroughly rationalized, and these rationalized elements act as myths giving rise to 
more formal organization” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p.345). We adopt a neo-institutional perspective as 
the domain theory for this study for several reasons. First, we consider the pressure imputed into organiza-
tions to report CSR as directly attributable to calls for the same from broader society, as often cited in man-
agement accounting research (Bebbington, et al 2008).  Over the last decade and a half, CSRR has emerged 
as a critical practice in organizations globally (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006).  As broader societal concern 
over the impacts of organizational endeavors have emerged (Stern Review, 2006; Thuiller, 2007), organiza-
tions have increasingly felt the pressure to respond to such concerns raised by key stakeholders like gov-
ernments and customers by the provision of information on measures adopted to address these concerns 
(Kuisma et al. 2013). Research has also evidenced a different impact from this societally induced norm  - 
some organizational studies have identified how the personal values of managers as shaped by external 
exposure (in society), drive their decision to conduct CSR (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). To the extent 
that CSRR arises from the acceptance of CSR as a socially desirable norm and therefore drives “rationalized 
activities” that shape modern organizations, we consider our study’s findings to be amenable to conceptu-
alisation within a neo-institutionalist lens.  
Neo-institutionalist theorising has been widely used in prior sustainability focused studies (e.g. Jones 1999; 
Yin and Zhang 2012; Avetisyan and Ferrary, 2013; Eriksson-Zetterquist et al. 2005). A number of Nordic 
researchers have applied institutional theory to consider issues of organizational structure and processes 
(e.g.  Brunsson and Olsen 1990; Czarniawska and Sevon 2003; Eriksson-Zetterquist et al., 2005; Johansson 
2002; Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Stannegård, 2000). Institutional theory also finds growing conceptual pres-
ence in management accounting research (e.g. Burns and Scapens, 2000; Granlund and Lukka 1998)   
The focus of this study on the motivation by organizations to report CSR also lends itself theoretically to 
isomorphism (Oliver, 1991).  Isomorphism refers to multiple organizations exhibiting aligned characteristics 
(Oliver, 1988).  Building upon DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as well as earlier works on isomorphism (Hawley, 
1950; Hannah and Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), Oliver (1988) explains isomorphism as a “ho-
mogeneity among organizations in a population” (p.543). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) similarly ask “… why 
there is such startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices” (p.148).  
We focus on the three types of isomorphism identified in the literature as explained by DiMaggio and Pow-
ell (1983). These include coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism motivations for innovation 
adopters. These three types of isomorphism were originally postulated to explain different rationales for 
the existence of aligned practices in different firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Each type provides an 
alternative theoretical rationale for organizational choice in the enactment of practices.  
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We question these underlying motivations for isomorphic behaviors by studying the reporting practices of 
early and late CSR adopters.  To survive, organizations conform to social norms prevailing in the environ-
ment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) which drive institutional isomorphism, both structurally and 
procedurally, to gain organizational legitimacy (Suchman 1995).  
Coercive isomorphism sources from the pressures imposed by external stakeholders, be they other corpo-
rations, end customers or broader society, on a firm concerned.  Here, firms choose to adopt an innovation 
because they see no other way to appease key stakeholders. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), specifically refer 
to environmental reporting caused by governmental regulation as one such example. Coercive isomor-
phism can manifest as symbolic, superficial attempts by companies to placate these key interest groups 
(Verbruggen et al. 2011). Firms therefore engage in innovation adoption when coerced, as a means of 
maintaining perceptions of legitimacy. Normative isomorphism manifests when there exists a transfer of 
norms from one institution to another, typically by pressures brought to bear by professions (collections of 
knowledge and expertise that diffuse frameworks and methods for operating to organizations).  The source 
institution for the commencement of a “norm” is typically crafted as an educational one (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). The proliferation of innovations via normative isomorphism thus manifest by the introduction 
of a new chief executive with learned ideas from her source professions, ideas put forward by management 
executives that bring with them a knowledge learned from professions, or the diffusion of ideas from pro-
fessional bodies (such as the CPA professional accounting body).  Normative isomorphism is bereft of exter-
nal pressure, in the sense that organizations transition into these practices quite ubiquitously, without a 
sudden external pressure (Mizruchi and Fein 1999) such as regulatory changes.  
Mimetic isomorphism manifests when organizations model themselves on other organizations (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983).  A key logic underpinning mimetic isomorphism is the assumption of risk, and low costs.  
The “borrowing” organization experiences uncertainty, and proceeds to mimic the innovation of a similar 
other organization that has seen success from an innovation.  Consequently, mimetic isomorphism is often 
tied to uncertainty reduction.  In industries, firms practicing mimetic isomorphism tend to be firms other 
than the first entrant into a market (Mizruchi et al. 1999). 
Early/Late CSR Adoption   
The neo-institutionalist view offers a lens for examining CSRR that arguably combines the different logics 
inherent in other theoretical perspectives.  For example, the traditional economic rationalist view presented 
by Friedman (1970) views a corporation’s role as earning profits for owners, and in so doing, maximizing the 
value of the corporation. This view is limited to one of financial responsibility – the pursuit of maximum 
returns for principals. In such a model, CSR is regarded as a cost (Branco and Rodrigues 2006; Länsiluoto and 
Järvenpää 2008) that limits profit making. A second view consistent with stakeholder theory considers 
continuous growth as requiring investments in sustainability issues (Bramwell and Lane 1993). Stakeholder 
theory extends the corporate planning model to include external influences on corporate social 
responsibility decisions beyond the principal. These literatures broadly recognise the relationship between 
corporate responsibility and corporate reputation (Peloza 2006; Bebbington et al. 2008) and consequently 
produce a theoretical argument for company reporting about the expectations of different types of 
stakeholders beyond investors (Cheng et al. 2014), to include customers (Bhattacharya and Sen 2004), 
employees (Branco and Rodrigues 2006), and other non-governmental organizations (Eesley and Le-nox  
2006).  
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While the economic rationalist perspective sees CSR reporting as a cost, and the stakeholder theory view 
considers it a necessary reporting mechanism to satisfy the needs of non-owner stakeholders, legitimacy 
theory suggests that organizations continually seek to enhance their perception amongst key players by 
conducting CSR, especially if it is considered as part of the boundaries and norms of their respective 
societies.  CSR is therefore seen as a means for enhancing their legitimacy perception amongst customers 
and other key players (Suchman 1995). From a legitimacy theory perspective, a company will voluntarily 
report on activities if management perceives those activities as expected by the communities in which it 
operates (Deegan 2002; Deegan, Rankin and Tobin 2002; Cormier and Gordon 2001; O’Donovan 2002). 
Therefore, companies sometimes perceive CSRR as an add-on cost, and may equally perceive sustainability 
as an opportunity for "green PR" in creating their eco-friendly image (Busco et al. 2010). That is, a means to 
boost sales through projecting a sustainable image and thus having a positive impact on their future 
financial performance. Moreover, it has been argued that the prevailing approaches to corporate 
responsibility are unnecessarily disconnected from strategy, and as a consequence, obscure opportunities 
for companies to produce societal benefits while retaining a competitive commercial advantage. Porter and 
Kramer (2006) claim that if corporations were to analyse their opportunities for social responsibility using 
the same frameworks which guide their core business choices, they would discover that CSR can be much 
more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed – it can be a potent source of innovation and 
competitive advantage.  Given that CSRR is the means through which CSR is communicated within and 
outside a firm, the neo-institutional lens we subscribe to with a focus on isomorphism allows for a sufficient 
and appropriate analysis of voluntary CSR practice. 
Isomorphism and competitive strategy 
The pressure for organizations to conform to social norms through CSRR manifests in isomorphic behaviors. 
Strategically, early adopters of an innovation do so in order to seek a competitive advantage, differentiating 
themselves from competitors (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). Why is this so? The early adopter of CSRR 
seeks to pioneer a practice to appease key stakeholders – to be seen as communicating information on a 
practice whose value is becoming apparent to a majority of society.  By differentiating itself from 
competitors, the early adopter seeks competitive advantage. This pursuit of uniqueness strongly aligns to a 
differentiation strategy (Porter, 1980).  Alternatively, the early adopter may seek this differentiation in order 
to placate the interests of regulatory authorities.   
Late adopters, meanwhile, generally adopt a strategy of mimicry – copy others in order to be seen to be 
keeping up with current practices, for purposes of appeasing key stakeholders by engaging in a practice that 
is increasingly becoming a social norm.  Mimetic isomorphism bears strong resemblance to such a rationale 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Owing to cost constraints, late adopters may well delay the onset of the 
activity concerned, in order to minimise costs arising from the development and operationalization of the 
activity (Perry and Sheng, 1999), in that duplication (mimicry) is more cost effective than development.   
This link between strategy and isomorphism is therefore emphasised in our study, and will be mobilized via 
a set of hypotheses.   
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
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In this section, we present a set of hypotheses summarising our expected relations between key variables in 
our study, drawing upon our discussion of neo-institutional theory, early vs. late adopters, and competitive 
strategy.  
In developing our hypotheses, we commence with a general argument relating to the link between the 
conduct of CSR activities by businesses, and the reporting of the same (CSRR). That is, CSRR is by default, 
undertaken by firms that conduct CSR (van Marrewijk, 2003). However, does it naturally follow that all firms 
that conduct CSR activities engage in CSRR?  Traditional isomorphic arguments might argue in favor of this 
linkage. Firms conduct sustainability activities in order to keep up with competition (isomorphism borne 
from mimetic forces), feel the pressure to do so from stakeholder (isomorphism from coercive forces) or are 
educated to do so by managers or consultants (isomorphism from normative forces). The engagement with 
this socially desirable practice is performed with the intention of communicating its worth to key 
stakeholders, especially for coercive and mimetic currents.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H0: Firms conducting CSR activities engage in CSRR. 
It is acknowledged that when novel management and reporting practices diffuse, the reasons for this 
diffusion converges into three broad rationales as consistent with neo-institutionalism. Firms might apply an 
innovation owing to the imposition of regulation or broader stakeholder pressures (coercive force), 
management or professional services firms might drive the innovation into the reporting system of the firm 
(normative force), or the firm might follow in the footsteps of other firms that have done the same (mimetic 
force).  We contend that when early adopters conduct CSRR, their motivations for doing so align with the 
appeasement of stakeholders (coercive force) or the initiation of inspired management (normative force).  
The application of CSR is consequently integrated more comprehensively into the practices of the firm, 
owing to the external pressure and the internal knowledge of management intending to roll-out the CSR 
innovation.  We term this stronger alignment between the content reported and their actual manifestation 
as operational processes in the firm, as “embeddedness”2. Late adopters, by contrast, adopt a mimetic 
stance whereby their use of CSR is likely driven by the need to “keep up” with competition, maintaining a 
ceremonial conformity in the application of CSR. Consequently, the actual embeddedness of CSR claims 
versus its CSRR of late adopting firms will be lower. We construct arguments consistent with Ansari et al 
(2010), in proposing that firms differ in their adoption practices depending on their early or late adoption 
decision.  
We therefore consider early reporters of CSR as first-movers, and their foray into CSR as more likely a 
function of an authentic pursuit for real sustainability practices and an intention to report this positive 
performance (Barnett et al. 2013), as driven by CSR practice as a socially desirable norm (Oliver, 1988), and 
not merely one for improving brand image (Werther and Chandler 2005) – though this is likely to be a 
desirable consequence. Consequently, such firms have arguably grounded integrated sustainability practices 
into their overall organizational strategy, and resulting operations. Similar relations can be observed in other 
management innovations, such as activity based costing, where early adopters showed a genuine concern 
for costing alignment as a response to strategic challenge (Gosselin 1997; Malmi 1999; Sisaye 2003). In 
studies investigating the diffusion of EVA in organizations, where the earlier firms to which Stern Stewart 
applied EVA to, genuinely concerned themselves with the desire to enhance profitability (Chen and Dodd 
                                                          
2
 We test embeddedness by analysis survey respondent responses to the question “To what extent has corporate responsibility 
strategy integrated into operative control of your organization?”. Results are shown in Table 8. 
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1997). From this perspective, early reporters are expected to show higher levels of integration than later 
reporters. 
H1: Early CSR reporters exhibit higher levels of CSR embeddedness than late CSR reporters 
The link between CSR and strategy as previously introduced is expanded to develop two hypotheses. A 
firm’s willingness to engage in different activities indicates an intention to pursue sources of competitive 
advantage that are unique and different to that of industry competitors.  To this extent, early reporters that 
are first movers with respect to sustainability practices reveal their preference for pursuing a more 
differentiated strategy, where the objective is to provide a novel offering, or reveal a novel practice that 
captures the attention of a customer or end user. Normative and/or coercive isomorphism manifests in 
early reporters for purposes of managing the needs of key stakeholders in order to manage their 
expectations, impressing the same with the early implementation of an increasingly desirable sustainability 
reporting practice. Baumgartner and Ebner (2010) go further, explicitly acknowledging that sustainability 
related business activities hold an advantage in their connection to differentiation strategy, specifically from 
an innovation standpoint.  Later reporters, by contrast, arguably do so in response to the innovative actions 
of their first-moving counterparts, and hence limit their focus to one of an “imitation” driven sustainability 
strategy to keep pace with their competitors. The imitation of CSR practices as opposed to its development 
also represents a lower cost alternative. To this extent, later adopters experience mimetic isomorphic 
currents extensively in relation to CSR, while initial adopters are more likely to genuinely do so in the light of 
powerful non-regulatory external stakeholders (community/customers/suppliers) concerns and therefore 
see an opportunity to differentiate themselves from their competition. Here, key managers drive CSRR 
based on their knowledge and understanding of the practice (normative isomorphic force) fundamentally 
distancing (differentiating) themselves from their competition. An associated area relating to early adopters 
is the literature around radical innovation, where a majority of such innovation is deployed by firms that 
come to be the “first mover”, or early adopter of the innovation. The radical innovation literature strongly 
aligns the pursuit of radical innovation with the attainment of uniqueness as a source of competitive 
advantage (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Leifer et al. 2001; Koberg et al. 2003). Given that the very purpose 
of an early reporter is to perform a function that differentiates it from its competitors, we contend that:  
H2: Early CSR reporters are more likely to apply a differentiation strategy. 
H3: Late CSR reporters are more likely to apply an imitation strategy. 
Large organizations tend to be more visible to the general public, and from a neo-institutionalist 
perspective, more susceptible to the normative and coercive isomorphic pressures surrounding CSR 
reporting than smaller firms, owing to their exposure to a larger and wider band of stakeholders. Large 
firms are therefore more likely to engage in CSRR in order to manage the general public’s view, advertise 
their efforts surrounding CSR, or avoid surveillance (Benn et al. 2014). With access to resources that smaller 
firms cannot obtain, large firms thus tend to apply and benefit from CSR prior to their smaller counterparts 
(Kolk 2008).  This is especially apparent, given the high fixed costs that accrue from comprehensively 
engaging in CSRR. Studies surrounding the coercive isomorphism are largely directed at large firms in 
“controversial” industries choosing to engage in CSRR in order to placate the interests of impacted 
stakeholders (who are more than those relating to smaller firms), or choosing to lead the market and 
anticipating the informational needs of stakeholders, therefore reducing their cost of capital by voluntarily 
disclosing (Healy and Palepu 1991). There also exists a strong cost argument for CSR, which biases its 
reporting in favor of larger firms (Perrini et al. 2007). The establishment of information collation systems 
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outside traditional financial reporting arguably incurs significant costs, which are most likely able to be 
absorbed by larger firms (McWilliams and Segel 2001). We therefore hypothesize that: 
H4: Larger organizations are more likely to engage in CSRR than smaller organizations. 
 
 
METHOD 
This study applies a mixed methods approach. First, a field study was chosen because earlier literature 
provides limited evidence on the research question in this particular environment (Lillis and Mundy 2005; 
Ahrens and Dent 1998). The study contains a combination of qualitative field study interviews (e.g. Lillis and 
Mundy, 2005) and survey data (e.g. Dillman 2008). Supplementing the evidence from the field, a 
questionnaire survey, document analysis (CSR reports and CSR Award Reports), homepages of the case 
organizations, interviews and participation in public CSR related events are further used to explore 
voluntary CSRR in Finland. In addition, two of the interviewees write sustainability blogs and have published 
hundreds of writings about the content of the study.  Overall, the empirical setting in Finland is appropriate 
to our study as while CSR is voluntary for most firms, many firms continue to engage with it. Only Non-listed 
State Owned Enterprises and State majority-owned organizations have been required to undertake CSRR in 
Finland since 2011. State owners argue that they are ‘caretakers’ of the shares of such companies on behalf 
of the public, and therefore have to report their sustainability performance in an accurate and comparable 
manner (UNEP et al. 2013, p.17). Guidelines for reporting models given by ministries are based on GRI’s G3 
and G3.1 Guidelines, using a ‘comply or explain’ principle. As a result, only a minority of firms are required 
to publish CSR reports mandatorily and most of the firms do so voluntarily3. To illustrate the scale of the 
phenomenon of CSR in Finland, it has been reported that 156 Finnish companies and organizations reported 
CSR information in 2012 (in comparison, about 125 firms are listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange) (PwC, 2013). 
As a result, three out of four Top 500 companies in Finland do not publish any CSR information. As many as 
85 Finnish companies applied the GRI guidelines in their reporting (67 GRI adopters of 132 reporters in 
2010) (PwC, 2013). GRI guidelines are globally used, notwithstanding criticisms of their efficacy4. Even 
though the number of companies engaging in CSRR is moderate, Finnish companies do well in international 
comparisons. Finland ranks third amongst stock exchanges 5  which perform best in sustainability 
disclosures. (CK Capital, 2012). 
Interviews 
                                                          
3
 However, two issues guide reporting in all firms. First, The Finnish Accounting Act, 1997, requires certain companies to include 
material non-financial issues in the director’s report of the annual/financial report, and refers to the guidelines for good practice. In 
practice, key ratios and other information on personnel and environmental factors, and other potentially significant matters 
impacting on the operations of the reporting entity, need to be disclosed. http://bit.ly/10XPLAh. Second, The Finnish Accounting 
Board issued general guidelines for the recording, accounting and disclosing of environmental issues as part of the legally required 
financial statements in 2006. The guidelines are broadly based on the EU commission’s recommendation 2001/453/EU, and are to 
be interpreted to be a part of binding good accounting practice. www.tem.fi/?l=en&s=878 
4
 For example, Isaksson and Steimle (2009) analysed CSR reports of five firms on the cement industry in Sweden and conclude that 
the current GRI guidelines are not sufficient to make sustainability reporting for that industry relevant and clear. They argue that the 
guidelines are not sufficient for assuring that a report answers the questions of how sustainable a company is and how quickly it is 
approaching sustainability. 
5
The ranking is based on disclosure rates and timeliness for seven so-called "first-generation" sustainability indicators including 
energy, greenhouse gas emissions, water, waste, lost time injury rate, payroll costs and employee turnover. 
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We accessed five case organizations: 12 interviews within these five organizations were conducted. Three of 
the case organizations have published sustainability reports for several years while two organizations have 
been more recent in their CSRR. The interviewed individuals often had a title such as a sustainability 
manager, environmental manager, strategy manager, CFO, business controller or environmental engineer. 
The case organizations are well known companies in their industries. The first company is a state-owned, 
not stock-listed property company (Caretaker), the second company is a stock-listed and mainly a state-
owned traveling company (Traveller), the third company is a for-profit energy company owned by few cities 
(Electrician), the fourth company is stock-listed company on construction industry (Builder) and the fifth 
company is stock-listed environmental company (Cleaner).  
The interviews (see Table 1), which took place in 2010-2013, are triangulated by using publicly available 
materials such as the sustainability reports, homepages of the firms and published features in newspapers. 
The public material was used to obtain a general view of the firm before the interviews and thereafter to 
confirm the information obtained in the interviews. In addition, analyses of environmental and 
sustainability reports (about 50 pages per report, four organizations, over ten year period; about 2000 
pages in total) gave us information on the development and trends of sustainability reporting. 
In order to get a broader understanding of the different motivations, usability and assurance of corporate 
social responsibility reports, we interviewed the following: 1) Senior inspector, Ministry of the Environment; 
2) Member of CSR competition jury, University; 3) Partner, A head of Sustainable Business Solutions in a Big-
4 audit firm; 4) Auditor, Sustainability Expert in a Big-4 audit firm; 5) The CEO and Investor of a private fund 
management company; and 6) Head of Responsible Investments of the largest insurance company in 
Finland. 
Survey 
The target sample of the survey included the CFOs of Top 500 Companies and the Sustainability Managers 
of Top 240 Companies6.  In addition, nine other CSR reporters were identified and their CFOs and 
Sustainability Managers were included in the target sample. The questionnaire (see Table 2) was sent in 
December 2012 by a mail post to 753 respondents from which 807 returned the questionnaire giving a 
response rate of 10.6% (see Table 3). In addition, Table 4 presents background information on the 
respondents. 12 out of these 80 organizations volunteered to be case companies for the future interviews.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In our mixed methods approach, survey findings are used as the basis upon which to observe broad 
relationships between sustainability activities and CSRR amongst the 80 firms (H0), which we then clarify 
through the use of five case firms via the application of our neo-institutional lens (H1, H2, H3, H4). We 
therefore commence with a brief discussion of our survey results, and proceed to clarify our findings with 
                                                          
6
 Based on the data we have, we affirm that we received only one response per company. The respondents were voluntarily able to 
give their contact details - 28 respondents out of 80 responded anonymously and the remaining 52 respondents gave their contact 
details. None of them were from the same company. Finally we compared the anonymous 28 respondents regarding the company 
size, industry and other background information listed in the questionnaire but did not find matching pairs. We thus believe that the 
sample of 80 represents 80 unique organizations.  
7
 Only 16% of the reporters of our study report on CSR mandatorily (being at least partially state-owned) while others report 
voluntarily. 
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our field evidence, integrating this explication with the neo-institutional arguments relating to isomorphism 
in the field section, specifically incorporating early and late adopters8. In this manner, we provide a richer 
context from which to affirm our hypotheses. In our survey, we distinguish between firms running a 
sustainable business, and firms engaging in CSRR. While the vast majority of firms in the sample engage in 
CSR practices, the proportion of firms that actually report these practices, and therefore conduct CSRR, is 
much smaller. 
Survey data  
We collected survey evidence on the motivations and perceived consequences of CSRR among Finnish 
firms. Table 5 shows the extent and reasons Finnish organizations’ motivations to engage in sustainability, 
and the extent to which they consider having benefited as a consequence of their sustainable business 
engagement. From a motivational perspective, we note the prevalence of drivers for CSRR that strongly 
align to isomorphic arguments. For example, the “help us better managing our corporate image” and “to 
increase customer satisfaction”, as well as “to meet the expectations of shareholders” and “to meet 
stakeholder stipulations” relate to coercive isomorphic reasons, where firms engage in CSRR in order to 
appease stakeholders. Alternatively, the “to follow the example given by markets and competitors” reason 
strongly aligns to the logic underpinning the mimetic force.   
Generally, findings indicate that the top five motivations for the conduct of sustainability business practices 
(independent of reporting preference) are related to values, corporate image, customer satisfaction, 
creation of sustainable business solutions and shareholders expectations – these findings are in line with 
prior studies as previously outlined. Interestingly, the sample firms have generally not met these five most 
important goals which they set as their sustainability objectives9. Interestingly, we observe that from the full 
sample of 80, for which 72 firms identified as conducting CSR activities, only 46 (63.89%) conducted CSRR.  
This unexpected finding contradicts our neo-institutionalist stance marshalled using isomorphism as 
presented in H0, where we expected CSRR to strongly align to firms’ conduct of CSR. We therefore reject 
H0. As will be indicated below based on our case findings, we also observed that firms conducting CSR and 
CSRR appeared to integrate their CSR activities into their actual operations to a greater extent than firms 
conducting CSR but not CSRR. This was unexpected, as firms that conduct CSR without CSRR might have 
been thought to be implementing CSR more authentically, as they are not using it as an external signalling 
mechanism (CSRR). 
                                                          
8
 We define early and late SCR reporters according to their experience of CSR reporting in years. Early reporters (both in the survey 
data and in the case studies) started CSR reporting in 2009 or earlier. Late reporters started CSR reporting in 2010 or later, having a 
maximum of three years of reporting experience (the survey data was collected in 2013). 
9
 For Tables 5, 6 and 7, we observe the statistical significance of the differences in means between mean scores for the “observed 
consequence” and “motivation” for each reason, using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test. We apply a sig. p<0.05. We apply a non-
parametric test as our survey data is ordinal, and we have no prima facie reason to assume our data will be normally distributed.  
We also conduct our significance tests assuming two way (non-directional significance) as we have no ex-ante expectation that our 
results should trend in a direction.  Also, in terms of our classification of findings, we consider goals not to be attained in Tables 5, 6 
and 7 when their “obtained consequence” scores are lower than their “motivation: scores, irrespective of significance.  However, if 
an “observed consequence” score is greater than a “motivation” score, we say the goal was attained.  If an “observed consequence” 
score is greater than a “motivation” score in a statistically significant manner, we classify this as a goal being exceeded. In this way, 
we separate our findings when an “observed consequence” score are greater than “motivation” scores to incorporate the 
significance effect.  When an “observed consequence” scores are less than “motivation” scores, we contend that significance does 
not affect the result that the goal was not attained. 
 13 
 
To better understand the reasons for the gap between reporters and non-reporters, we tested our results 
for CSR reporters and non-reporters (Table 6), and compared the results to the whole sample (Table 5).  
When comparing Tables 5 and 6, it can be seen that the motivations for engaging in sustainability activities 
are somewhat similar for both reporters and non-reporters. Table 6 shows that in the main, CSR reporters 
do not benefit significantly more than non-reporting CSR firms from more sustainable business engagement 
(notwithstanding their greater integration of CSR into their activities, as previously explained). This 
surprising finding possibly signals that the expectations of future benefits which sustainability practices 
produce may be perceived by reporters, but these benefits have not been realised in their actual activities. 
When comparing CSR reporters and non-reporters, it can be observed that CSR reporters have attained 
their goals in meeting stakeholder stipulations, meeting the expectations of civil societies and associations, 
and following the example given by markets and competitors while non-reporters have not attained these 
goals. In addition, CSR reporters have experienced an availability of finance and lower cost of capital, as well 
as the internationalisation of their company’s business more extensively than non-reporters. 
Table 7 depicts the different reasons that motivate the sample firms to produce corporate social 
responsibility reports and the extent to which they have experienced beneficial consequences from this 
reporting. The top 5 reasons for reporting are corporate values, corporate image, shareholders’ 
expectations and employee and customer satisfaction. However, the findings again indicate that the 
expected benefits of reporting have not been realised.  
Table 4 indicates that CSR reporters are more prone to be large organizations10, listed on the stock exchange 
and have a dedicated and independent CSR manager, often directly reporting to the CEO (as opposed to a 
CSR manager under CFO responsibility). In this sense, the results indicate that larger firms have the capacity 
to administratively incorporate CSRR practices than smaller firms, arguably owing to their greater 
resourcing capacity arising from scale  but this still does not explain why firms might choose be an early or 
late adopter of CSRR. Overall, our survey evidence indicates that pure economic rationale does not fully 
explain why Finnish firms voluntarily publish CSR information. Motivations seem to vary. 
We consequently proceed to analyse our field data in order to clarify the findings from our survey data, and 
obtain an adequate explanation for CSRR motivations by firms that conduct CSR.  Why might we report, and 
how do these explanations afford us new insight on how the different forces (mimetic, normative, coercive) 
relate to rationales for CSRR? With the exception of H4, our explanations regarding firm motivations for 
early versus late reporters (H1, H2 & H3), and the impact of practices driven by the different isomorphism 
types, are gleaned in order to address our remaining hypotheses. Our following discussion of five CSRR 
users (three early users and two late users) reveals insights into how institutional logics for conducting CSRR 
manifest, and how these logics morph into other logics over time.  We also observe theoretically interesting 
departures from expected isomorphism rationales, especially surrounding coercive sources of isomorphism 
and mimetic sources of isomorphism in these firms.  Our remaining findings are split into a brief description 
of our five case study respondents, followed by a sub-section respectively reflecting on how each 
hypothesis category is addressed.   
                                                          
10
 We observed strong variation in the size of these firms, though they were dominantly large firms.  Also, and 
uniquely, the lower bands of the largest 500 firms in Finland are significantly smaller than the top band (as observable 
in Table 4).  Owing to the smaller economy, there is stronger variation in size across the largest 500 firms, allowing us 
to observe a size effect.  We therefore make claims around the size effect with respect to ”larger” and ”smaller” firms, 
without actually juxtaposing a multinational large firm against a small business of 20 employees (by way of example).  
We think the incremental argument surrounding size is more useful, subtle and applicable to other researchers and 
practice. 
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Field data - Early reporters 
Caretaker 
Caretaker was originally a government owned enterprise which was privatised in 1999 but retains majority 
government ownership. It acts as the government’s expert on the working environment and working 
premises. Caretaker provides maintenance service for thousands of buildings owned by the government. 
Caretaker has a long history of voluntary reporting, before CSRR became mandatory for state-owned 
companies in 2011. CSR is embedded in the company’s strategy - they see it as a natural part of being a 
state-owned company and thus being accountable to tax payers. The company has published Sustainability 
reports since 2001 (the first Finnish publicly listed firm in the same industry to produce a CSRR did so in 
2010). Caretaker frequently receives annual reporting awards for their reporting. Caretaker has benefitted 
much from being sustainable and has therefore experienced a long list of benefits. They have been able to 
integrate sustainability issues into a balanced scorecard and into the incentive systems affecting every 
employee. Getting the indicators, correct numbers and cases to the report was made possible as 
management had been reporting on sustainability issues internally to the Board of Directors for many years. 
They engaged in environmental reporting for internal purposes in 1975 to control the use of oil and have 
records of many measures collected since then. They currently report publically, including to owners. The 
impetus for public CSRR arose from the owners. The company was privatised in 1999 and the 
representatives of the owner, who include politicians and government officers, had to understand detailed 
financial statements with minimum or no financial education. The firm started to report on CSR in order to 
justify their expenditure and savings, using operational and strategic narratives. Thus, we consider CSRR as a 
supplement to traditional financial reporting in Caretaker.  
Traveller 
Traveller published its first CSR report in 1987, limiting it to environmental impact discussions; it was highly 
technical in nature and legally required in its industry. These reports became public in 1996, when the 
company actively sought to more concertedly engage with the broader community outside their industry, 
regarding their CSR endeavours. They subsequently commenced full CSRR (incorporating social and 
environmental concerns) in 2008 and earned reporting awards. They publish both financial and CSR reports, 
such that triple-bottom line reporting including social reports was not a significant challenge from a 
reporting perspective.  Owing to its long association with CSRR, Traveller unsurprisingly possessed a wide 
array of systems containing much CSR data at their disposal. This data was collated into reports by three 
individuals. 
Traveller, a transportation company, is ranked first in their industry, concerned with long distance travel 
methods that consume high levels of energy resources. Its management considers Traveller as a pioneer 
enterprise. Interestingly, the company has engaged in radical strategic changes towards a sustainability 
focus, though their core activity does not lend itself to being sustainability “friendly”.  Instead of being seen 
adversely as an environmentally destructive company, they have sought to create a business case for 
sustainability practices and use sustainability arguments in their sales and marketing to attract clients while 
also justifying cost savings internally with staff and management using a sustainability ethos.  In many ways, 
for Traveller the core activity is engaging in being sustainable. Indeed, Traveller executives are very 
pragmatic in their arguments for adopting a sustainability approach. 
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The company openly uses CSRR as a sales argument in attracting customers. This was commercially viable 
during the years of economic growth, but has been less successful over the recent past. During the 
recession, customers selected their travel company based on price – with CSR being seen as a secondary 
factor in customer choice. The company speaks for voluntary CSRR, supporting the idea that all companies 
should have the possibility to choose whether to report on their sustainable activities or not. If companies 
are forced to CSR report, Traveller could lose its strategic competitive advantage – or at least a part of it, as 
the corporate signal to publish CSRR becomes less unique. 
Therefore, while the firm’s ideal is that CSRR will remain voluntary, they are not unaware of the possibility 
that CSRR could become made mandatory.  To this extent, they are also lobbying to influence the way the 
industry develops and how profits should in the long run be generated. Sustainability is their strategy for 
creating competitive advantage.  Traveller seeks to set the basis for CSRR, that only a minority of firms 
might be able to adequately uphold. 
Electrician 
Electrician is an energy company. It has published CSR reports since 2002 and received multiple CSR 
reporting awards. Electrician integrated CSR information into its annual report in 2010. However, they have 
experience of publishing environmental reports since 1996, not incorporating social aspects to their 
operations. Also HR reports were delivered to managers internally. 
The primary reason for producing CSRR is that the former CEO was personally interested in sustainability 
issues and possessed international experience of the same. He implemented a sustainability strategy 
(incorporating CSR and CSRR) in the organization because he considered it an issue of strategic significance. 
However, due to a change of CEO, the strategy was re-thought and the new CEO was less receptive to 
viewing sustainability as a strategic issue. The Sustainability Manager expressed the difficulty posed by this 
change, explaining how representatives of owners, comprising mainly politicians and officers (the company 
is owned by a few cities), came to expect CSR information and asked for the company to still publish CSR 
information. 
While CSR issues were not integrated in the management practices to a great extent, resistance towards it 
was initially evident. Though the role of corporate image is now observable, CSR issues are not visible either 
in their marketing or branding activities. Sustainability is not deeply integrated into balanced scorecards or 
other managerial practices at the company. Managerial decisions are mainly made using financial criteria. 
CSRR is relevant in communicating with external stakeholders such as local residents and owners but not 
fully in managing the company. More and more clients ask for sustainability measures to be included in 
their own reports. Electrician is asked to provide CSR information to others in the supply chain, and thus 
continues to do so to satisfy its stakeholder demands. 
Field Data - Late Reporters 
Builder 
Builder initially commenced as a small business around a hundred years ago, but grew to become a large 
construction company, now listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Builder now markets itself as creating 
sustainable urban environments by building housing, business premises and infrastructure across entire 
areas in Europe. In the last 15 years, the company has increased remarkably in size, trebling its workforce 
and revenues. According to media, the construction industry has faced significant CSR challenges. These 
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relate to black markets, the employment of illegal labourers and unsafe working environments in Eastern 
Europe, Russia and Finland. This is a consequence of a lack of management control of long subcontracting 
chains and complex corporate structures. Builder has thus had to respond by communicating more openly 
about their CSR issues.  As a result, the first CSRR was prepared in 2013.  
For Builder, the primary motivation for producing CSR came from outside the company. External pressure 
from investors forced Builder to engage with CSRR.  Builder follows others regarding the content on what to 
report on. However, the CEO uses the information published from the sustainability report to promote the 
sustainability ethos for shareholders in the annual report. 
This suggests that the company aims to financially benefit by engaging in CSRR. However, CSR is not deeply 
integrated in internal business operations and they have not yet attained any tangible outcomes from its 
application. As a late reporter, Builder is motivated by outsiders and has imitated the reporting that 
conducted by leading competitors.  
 
Cleaner 
Cleaner is a stock-listed environmental company. In cooperation with their customers, they reduce waste 
volumes, recover materials and decrease the use of raw materials and energy. Thus, a responsible way of 
working is seen as a natural part of their business. Even though most Finns would regard this company as 
eco-friendly, it has not reported on their sustainable activities to outsiders prior to 2012 nor used their eco-
friendly image in marketing.  
Cleaner has produced a sustainability report since 2012 thus is a relatively young reporter. It had already 
reported many of the measures internally however. During the planning period, the company compared its 
internal measures and GRI in order to find lags and sought information about the indicators that GRI 
requires. In 2013 the company integrated corporate social responsibility report on the web in order to 
better support its sales instead of producing a separate hardcopy of the report. Clients, who are mainly 
large (multinational) companies, ask increasingly for information about sustainability related issues. As a 
result of being a part of a broader industry supply chain comprising upstream suppliers and downstream 
customers, Cleaner felt pressured to engage in CSRR in order to placate the informational needs of its 
related supply chain parties. 
 
CSR Embeddedness    
Prior to observing the response of our case firms, we affirm the position of Finnish CSR industry expert 
regarding the importance of integrating CSR into all aspects of a firm’s operations, and conducting the 
process with intent to actually change what is done in the organisation.   
” Companies try to prove goodness of their product in a way that their customers will save some 
resources when choosing their product. In my mind, the best reporters are the companies who have 
built their business idea on sustainability.” 
 17 
 
Our survey evidence provides mixed findings regarding the embeddedness construct.  Table 811 measures 
the effects of CSR on the operative controls of firms, based on seven measures.  Early reporters show a 
higher score than late reporters for six of the seven measures, but none of the differences are statistically 
significant.  Interestingly, our results in Table 9 show statistically significantly higher scores for the effects of 
CSR on the operative controls of firms for the same six of seven measures, when comparing reporters 
versus non-reporters. This highlights that firms that conduct CSR as well as CSRR appear to embed their CSR 
activities into their operations to a greater extent than firms that conduct CSR, but not CSRR. This, however, 
does not necessarily translate into goal attainment for the CSR goals of the firm, as previously established 
for H0.  To obtain a richer understanding of the factors that might drive a higher score, we reverted to our 
field evidence, which indicated broad support for higher CSR embeddedness12 amongst the early CSR 
adopters.  Two of our three early adopters (Caretaker and Traveller) evidence a high level of inter-linkages 
between CSR and other systems supporting their operations.  Caretaker’s CSR reporting relates to its 
balanced scorecard, incentive systems and strategy, emphasising this embeddedness. Caretaker also 
integrates its CSR into its control systems and HR training procedures with significant positive benefits: 
“We experienced CSR as a tool for human resource management. We convey information about these 
sustainability issues, we measure and we publish the outcomes. This educates, trains and develops our 
employees to act in more responsible ways. When we measure, follow and control something, it leads the 
action and CSR becomes a management control tool too. It is a very significant outcome.” 
     Caretaker Sustainability Manager 
Theoretically, the reasons for these control choices reveal insightful findings regarding the nature of 
isomorphism as it relates to CSR and existing systems in their organizations.  The high level of 
embeddedness in Caretaker relates to its desire to be a market leader, and justify its taxpayer expenditures.  
This most closely relates to coercive isomorphism, whereby sustainability practices and CSR reporting are 
undertaken to placate the interests of key stakeholders.  Interestingly, this style of conformity appears non-
ceremonial. Though evidencing a burden of expectation to report (coercive), Caretaker management 
willingly undertakes these practices with authentic intent, as evidenced by its genuine interlinking to extant 
systems in the firm. This link between coercive isomorphism and a genuine embeddedness is not intuitively 
found in most neo-institutionalist studies. In Traveller, another early reporter, we observe a similar 
embeddedness between CSR reporting and systems as in Caretaker, but the reasons for doing so more 
closely relate to pragmatic economic benefit, as opposed to an intent for sustainability reporting as an end 
objective.     
“Western companies do not do this because of philanthropic reasons but rather see an opportunity to create 
added value – a good image brings new customers and better chances for a value creation. In other words, 
a good brand will bring you an opportunity to add some profit premium on your costs of goods sold. The 
brand is something that you don’t want to destroy. In our company, we are proud of our brand which is very 
well known and highly respected in Finland… we don’t engage in sustainability things because of our green 
heart. This is in our financial interest. “ 
                                                          
11
 Tables 8 and 9 were tested using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, as a comparison was made between the medians of 
independent samples, comprised of different firms in each sample (early reporters vs. late reporters). 
12
 We measure embeddedness by a consideration of the extent to which case firms integrate CSR and CSRR into their day to day 
operations, beyond the setting of CSR as a strategic goal, as revealed by interview respondents. Additionally, our survey data 
contains 7 CSR goals that relate to the embeddedness measure, per Table 8.  Six of these seven measures show a higher score for 
early respondents, relative to late respondents, though none of the results are statistically significant.  We therefore revert to our 
interview data to more richly observe for differences between early and late respondents. 
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(Sustainability Manager, Traveller) 
 
In Traveller, coercive isomorphism drives an economic pragmatism – the needs of external stakeholders in 
the highly sensitive emissions area, forced Traveller to meet the informational needs demanded by its 
community stakeholder group, in order to ensure customers (as members of the community) continue to 
use its services.  In Caretaker, it drives a managerial focus to report CSR authentically, in order to appease 
their own justification of expenditures for taxpayers, as well as the informational demands of politicians and 
taxpayers.  Notwithstanding the two competing rationales for a coercive isomorphic stance, we observe an 
embeddedness of CSR. The reverse is noted for late reporters, who appear to conduct CSR somewhat more 
symbolically and with less evident embeddedness into extant systems. Builder, for example, is indicative of 
mimetic alignment, whereby management copied the indicators used by competitors, without direct 
evidence of its integration or relevance to Builder’s internal operations:  
 
“Well, surely other companies in the same industry affect the content that we report on. When I prepared 
the first CSR at last year and was considering which indicators to report upon, I went through competitors’ 
past reports and looked at what [indicators] they reported. In a way, I checked what were the indicators 
which they have thought important to report.” 
 
Management in Builder more directly and succinctly asserted that they saw no actual benefit to CSR 
reporting in Builder, which drove the mimetic isomorphic stance (copy competitors): 
 
“I don’t know how many companies indeed benefit from reporting by using GRI. For us, it is a formal 
procedure; we have to apply it [GRI] because everyone else is using it.” 
 
More generally, a Finnish Big 4 Audit Partner heading CSR practices confirmed that late reporter firms 
frequently adopt practices owing to the peer pressure felt from competitor firms that have already done so: 
 
“In practise, peer pressure influences in a way that it looks very odd if others report while you don’t 
tell about sustainability issues. The main idea is that that stakeholders are nowadays more 
interested on what happens in the companies.” 
 
Finally, Cleaner evidenced late reporting of CSR and adopted a mimetic isomorphic stance, with little CSR 
embeddedness in indicators within actual practices.  Interestingly, Cleaner invested in CSR reporting to keep 
up with competitors, but the rationales for their doing so strongly aligned to an authenticity not normally 
observed in the mimetic isomorphic stance. Cleaner was considered an eco-friendly firm, that practiced 
sustainability across its different facets of operations, but somewhat disconnected their CSR reporting from 
their activities. The reasons lie in the lower strategic value perceived by management in conducting CSR 
reporting,  because the general perception of the customer and regulatory stakeholder groups was that CSR 
had to have been practiced with an extensively eco-friendly setting.  Ironically, the strong link between the 
company’s strategy to advance CSR introduced a measure of complacency amongst management and key 
stakeholders, who perceived a lesser need to report the same. 
   
“People assume that we are in [the CSR] and operate in that way. Well, I'll say that it would be quite odd 
that as the leading environmental company we wouldn't report about it. - - - In addition, we have to deliver 
lot of information to our clients - about their waste consumption and material efficiency - which they include 
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in their own sustainability reports. We produce that information for many companies. Our reliability to make 
it, in their eyes, matters too. (Sustainability Manager, Cleaner, 2nd year reporter)” 
Overall, we report H1 is upheld in that a higher CSR embeddedness aligns with early reporters rather than 
late reporters. However, the isomorphic rationales and their motivations vary significantly. Importantly, 
coercive and mimetic isomorphism manifest amongst early and late adopters in different ways, and using 
rationales that have been less explored in the literature. 
 
CSR adoption and Strategy 
 
Our field data show support for H2.  Of the three early adopters, Traveller and Electrician both regarded CSR 
as a strategy that differentiated and set them apart from competitors. Traveller was strategic in its pursuit of 
this differentiation and they lobbied governments to design CSR reporting requirements that aligned to 
their own, making it harder for their competitors to follow suit: 
“I think that [as a pioneer] you get a chance to develop the actions [of the industry] and what should be 
reported. We are very active in several international associations in our industry. I’m, for example, member 
of the green group of the N.N. [industry association]. All of our peers don’t report yet. I’ll bring some ideas 
from there, but most importantly, that’s a channel to influence others on how companies [on our industry] 
should report. - - - For the same reason, I’m also in the process of establishing a network of sustainability 
managers here in Finland.” 
Electrician considered abandoning CSR upon the exiting of their former CEO, but the current CEO 
maintained the system in order to retain a brand image in response to management request, continuing an 
activity that set it apart from its competitors.  To this extent, Electrician and Traveller show evidence of early 
adopters conducting CSR, with the purpose to being viewed uniquely by customers, in relation to 
competitors. The rationales for doing so relate to a need to placate key stakeholder concerns (coercive 
isomorphism), or apply managerial expertise to the deployment of CSR reporting practices (normative 
isomorphism).  The strategy executed as the basis for this rationale was aligned to a differentiator strategy 
type. We note that Caretaker (an early adopter) is not reflective of such a pursuit of strategic differentiation, 
as its service provision had  few indirect and no direct competitors – even after privatisation.  
Our field evidence surrounding the late adopters reveals a strong inclination for an imitative posture to 
conducting CSRR (mimetic isomorphism). This was especially apparent in Builder, and also in Cleaner.  
Builder engaged with CSRR with the express intention to reduce strategic pressures relating to their lack of 
reporting, and did so by confirming the replication of the reporting styles of its competitors that had earlier 
commenced reporting. To this extent, management in Builder suggest a classic mimetic isomorphic 
institutional rationale, as previously explained. 
Cleaner also imitated the reporting of its competitors, but presented a novel theoretical insight into the 
rationale for this mimetic isomorphism. Cleaner was an environmental company, strongly reputed for its 
environmental awareness and alignment. Cleaner did not perceive the need for CSRR, as its strategic 
purpose was so aligned to the sustainability ethos that no external stakeholder or internal manager 
questioned the sustainability practices of Cleaner. Interestingly, its strong strategic alignment to the 
underlying sustainability phenomena drove its non-reporting of CSR. Subsequently, when CSRR became 
more prevalent in Finnish industries, Cleaner commenced reporting, using indicators that it had itself 
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recommended to other firms. While the architecture of the Cleaner adoption mirrors a mimetic isomorphic 
context, the reasons for its existence present a substantial departure from the ordinary logic surrounding 
the late adoption of an innovation. Overall, H3 is upheld, in that late adopters reveal an alignment to the 
mimetic isomorphic logic.  However, their reasons for doing so range from the orthodox (Builder) to the 
unexpected (Cleaner), relative to the literature concerning the mimetic isomorphic theoretical lens in the 
adoption of CSR reporting practices by late adopters. 
 
CSRR adoption and firm size 
 
Our descriptive survey data reveals that larger organizations partake in CSRR to a greater extent than 
smaller organizations. Table 4 shows that 17 out of the 18 firms in our sample with more than 5000 
employees are reporters rather than non-reporters. CSRR organizations are also more often stock listed 
companies which regularly publicly report on their activities while non-listed companies are less likely to 
engage in intensive reporting routines. This may also relate to the size effect, and listed companies are 
usually larger than unlisted companies. We could not comment on the size effect within our five case 
studies, as our case firms are all relatively large firms being among largest 150 firms in Finland, and all 
engaged in CSR as well as CSRR.  
 
Given the above, and based on our survey data, we contend that the extent of institutional pressures 
imposed on larger firms causes greater scrutiny from their more voluminous and varied stakeholder base, 
which subsequently impacts their penchant for engaging with CSRR.       
 
This relation was similarly expressed by an expert on CSR in a Big 4 Auditing firm based in Finland, who 
explained that there existed institutionalised  pressure for larger firms to apply CSRR. 
 
” It is institutionalized practise that all firms of a certain size will report on sustainability. It will 
arise concerns if they wouldn’t report.” 
 
Given the high fixed costs associated with CSRR, the greater funds at the disposal of larger firms arguably 
lends them a level of resourcing that is able to accommodate an alternative reporting form relative to a 
financial reporting system. This rationale reinforces the impact of size on the decision to engage intensively 
with CSR and its reporting. Such a view was similarly commented on by a member of the competition jury in 
Finland, and an expert in CSR, who explained that smaller firms simply perceived themselves as not having 
the resources to undertake CSRR, owing to the ”heavy process”. 
 
”Now we are in the phase where its seriousness or heaviness obstructs the diffusion of reporting 
practice. Especially smaller companies easily think that the CSR reporting is heavy reporting proses 
meant for the big companies and that they do not have enough resources to do it.” 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of most hypotheses, our findings reveal departures from the extant 
literatures surrounding institutional logics for CSRR use in organizations. The goals set for both sustainable 
business engagement and CSR reporting do not appear to have been realised. Indeed, surveyed Finnish 
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organizations have not attained the primary goals for which they engage in CSR and CSRR, as illustrated in 
the similarity in results across Table 5 and Table 6. Table 5 shows the motivations and consequences of CSR 
across all survey respondents, including reporters and non-reporters. Table 6 splits these into reporters and 
non-reporters. We find that for twelve of the seventeen motivations for conducting CSR, reporters fail in 
their goals like non-reporters do, but keep reporting. Of the thirteen identified motivations/benefits for 
conducting CSRR amongst reporters (Table 7), twelve do not obtain the level of outcomes for which their 
reporting was initiated. Our survey results therefore point to economically rational explanations not fully 
encompassing why corporations voluntarily publish CSR. Why do Finnish companies voluntarily publish CSR 
reports in the areas in which their goals remain unmet? 
Our field data from five firms within the survey sample provide a richer context to clarify our findings, 
revealing theoretical departures from the often cited institutional logics viewed as underpinning 
isomorphism in relation to the conduct of CSR and CSRR. First, we reveal the possibility that isomorphism 
types might alter across organizations with more mature firms engaging with an innovation. Two of our 
three early adopters comprehensively integrated CSR into other management systems and their overall 
strategic pursuits, but their reasons for doing so shifted over time. Traveller initially engaged intensively 
with CSRR owing to coercive isomorphism, and subsequently transitioned to a normative isomorphism logic 
when management saw CSR and its reporting as an option to differentiate the firm from its industry 
competitors. This leads us to a second contention we consider as theoretically novel and as a contribution 
to the literature. The extent of CSRR practice in Traveller was aided by its industry’s practices not aligning 
with a sustainable ethos. This proved an enabler for CSR – as management perceived it as a point of 
differentiation and competitive advantage.  Early reporters want to be the first on the market and apply a 
differentiation strategy through their CSR focus. Late reporters, by contrast, are more reactive to pressures 
from their markets, considering CSR within a mimetic isomorphism ideal. Here, the motivation appears to 
be uncertainty reduction. Builder engaged in the same for quite orthodox reasons – that is, keeping up with 
industry standards and applying indicators similar to that adopted by its early adopter industry competitors. 
Cleaner, however, presented a theoretically novel rational for the mimetic isomorphism it exhibited. 
Cleaner’s late adoption of CSRR owed to the very strong alignment of its operations to a sustainability ethos 
(somewhat opposite to Traveller). Cleaner was widely perceived as an institution with a strong 
environmental ethos, and thus stakeholders (internal and external) largely assumed the existence of their 
sustainable practices. It was only upon the wider proliferation of CSRR in Finnish industry, that management 
in Cleaner saw it as prudent that a strongly sustainability aligned firm should have some variant of a CSRR.   
CSRR at Cleaner is arguably less onerous and comprehensive relative to the early adopters (Caretaker, 
Traveller and Electrical), though their underlying embeddedness of sustainability practice is fundamentally 
deeper than these other firms.  Thus, a strong operational and strategic alignment to CSR proved a 
deterrent to the early adoption of CSR.  Early reporters can be authentic in their intention for conducting 
CSR (Caretaker), but they might purposefully report on sustainability for brand creation and added value 
(Traveller, Electrician), while late reporters might do so in order to not to lose their brand (Builder), or 
maintain superficial acknowledgement of their patently strong strategic and operational affinity to 
sustainable practice (Cleaner).  
We also note that once a firm commences CSR, it is difficult for it to disengage from it. Internally 
rationalised reasons seem to drive the objectives of early reporters of CSR while late adopters are more 
likely motivated to report about sustainability as a result of external forces, and neither groups appear to 
desire halting CSR.  This was especially apparent at Electrician, where a change from one CEO highly 
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supportive of CSR to another who was not, did not diminish CSR reporting which was seen as enhancing 
brand image protection. 
Overall, we contend that traditionally rationalized neo-institutional explanations do not fully explain CSRR 
practices. CSR reporting can be important for early reporters to create competitive advantage as they are 
the first to market. Late reporters align with others given an aversion to being regarded as ineffective within 
the industry and of being outliers if they do not publish CSR data.  
Many firms promote themselves as having established a sustainability strategy. 61.3%13 of all sample firms 
(80.4% of CSR reporters) created a sustainability strategy; 62.5% of the firms (76.2% of reporters) integrated 
sustainability into their goal setting such as the balanced scorecard and 46.3% of the firms (63% of 
reporters) linked it to their compensation system. When comparing desired motivations and the 
experienced benefits from sustainability concerns (Tables 5, 6), the survey findings indicate that the 
majority of organisations have not achieved their goals for CSRR, hence failing in their strategic objectives 
for conducting CSR and its reporting. Our interview data allows us to observe that the organizations which 
have also implemented sustainability practices at an operating level and executed CSRR through for 
example, goal setting via balanced scorecards and indicators tied to compensation, achieved their 
sustainability goals. Our findings remain when comparing CSR reporters and non-reporters (Table 9). They 
suggest that a sustainability strategy may be less efficacious if it has not been implemented in practice.    
This finding is consistent with the strategy literature and earlier studies on sustainability (e.g. Porter & 
Kramer, 2006).  
We also tested whether firms with a long CSRR history attain CSR goals more successfully than newcomers 
but find no significant results for the same from the survey data. This indicates that though our field data 
suggests different CSR motivations for early and late reporters, none experienced the outcomes/benefits 
initially sought. This result might be explained by possible differing motivations for conducting CSR in the 
past, versus the present. For example, firms might begin the use of CSR owing to external stakeholder 
pressures, but then continue to engage with it because of managerial expertise (normative force) or may 
change their reported numbers to reflect the styles of reports used by competitors (mimetic force). This 
aligns with our observation that isomorphism rationales may alter over time amongst reporters.  
The findings of our study, especially from our case respondent data suggest that late reporters are willing to 
’voluntarily’ publish sustainability reports because reporting has become more like a (corporate) norm and a 
refusal to publish CSR elements is interpreted as hiding sustainability efforts and being misaligned. Where 
CSRR was once considered an optional activity, it has become an expected reporting mechanism for Finnish 
companies.  
Overall, our mixed methods study comprising an 80 firm survey sample supported by case evidence from 
five organizations from the survey sample contributes to the literature surrounding neo-institutionalist 
rationales for CSRR adoption and impact. We show that normative and coercive isomorphism interplay to 
drive the adoption decision of early adopters, who do so in the interest of professing different strategic 
postures to placate key external stakeholders. This contrasts with prior studies that have mainly argued for 
mimetic and normative isomorphism as dominating the decision to implement CSRR amongst adopters 
(Arya and Zhang 2009). Finally, we find that late reporters often choose not to engage earlier as their 
                                                          
13
 The original question ”To what extent has corporate responsibility strategy integrated in operative control of your organization?” 
is asked on the Likert scale from 1 to 7. The percentage includes respondents who have integrated sustainability to an extensive 
level (values 5-7). 
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strategic proximity to the phenomena being reported is intrinsically close.  Such firms subsequently feel less 
need to opportunistically validate or signal their sustainability ethos using formal reporting systems. 
Notwithstanding this, for most organizations engaging in CSR, late reporters engage in CSRR to satisfy 
market expectations of their sustainability ethos, but not in a manner that is as sophisticated as other firms 
conducting CSR and reporting on this for strategic purposes. In this sense the early/late reporting of CSR 
might not proxy the higher or lower sustainability performance of an organization, respectively.   
Our findings allow us to introduce the possibility of coercive isomorphism effects in early adopter 
motivations, and question the assumptions surrounding mimetic isomorphic motivations as explained in 
current studies.  We also observe that isomorphic rationales can alter with time, and that early adopters are 
not necessarily strategically pure in their actual conduct of CSRR, often reporting for coercive isomorphic 
reasons (regulatory imposition), which might transition into normative isomorphism as strategic 
differentiation is pursued. This being a possibility ironically rendered more likely in industries where 
alignment to sustainability practices is more difficult to achieve, implying the pursuit of sustainability in the 
same industries yields greater competitive advantage. Late adopters, by contrast, might do so for 
traditionally identified mimetic isomorphism rationales, but uniquely, because their practices are so aligned 
to a sustainability ethos that organizations see no impetus to engage in CSRR early, and all stakeholders 
assume the organization to be sustainably aligned, further reducing the drive to conduct CSRR early. Hence, 
the strong alignment to sustainability practice might unexpectedly drive the later and more superficial 
adoption of CSRR. 
Our study is subject to the often cited limitations of survey data, and field data.  We have attempted to 
construct a representative sample of Finnish firms, and indeed our sample contains firms from a wide range 
of industries, but the extent to which this deviates from the overall population of Finnish firms arguably 
skews our findings. Additionally, the qualitative responses engaging perceptionary data is a limitation of 
survey studies generally. Management accounting research acknowledges this whilst resting also on such 
empirical data where this enhances our knowledge base of what drives accounting change. Finally, our field 
data comprises five firms, with a limited number of individuals providing comments from each firm. The 
views of these individuals cannot extend to those held generally and broadly by the managers in the firms 
studied or across the entire population of Finnish firms.  This we also recognise as a limitation of the field 
data deployed here.  The coupling of the two data types however, offers triangulation strength minimizing 
the impact of the data limitations. 
CSR reporting will likely grow as global demands grow for more environmental and social accountability 
from organizations. Our study has attempted to highlight the alternative motivations underlying 
organizations’ production of CSRR, and the theoretically different neo-institutionalist postures that might 
impact organizational rationales for doing so. It is hoped that future research will further delve into 
isomorphic dynamics where isomorphic types alter over time within organizations. This would enable 
comparison with our Finnish data with evidence from regions where firm CSRR may not yet find prevalence. 
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Table 1. Interview Source Information 
 Interviews with case organization respond-
ents 
Organization Duration Date 
1 Sustainability manager Traveller 62 min 24 Nov, 2010 
2 Sustainability Manager, Head of a Business 
Control,       CFO 
Caretaker 104 min 3 Dec, 2010 
4 Communication & Sustainability Manager Electrician 52 min 21 Jan, 2011 
5 Environmental Engineer Electrician 73 min 27 Jan, 2011 
6 CFO, Strategy Manager Electrician 69 min 27 Jan, 2011 
     
7 Communication & Sustainability Manager Electrician 144 min 21 Jun, 2011 
8 Sustainability manager Traveller Update by e-
mail 
August 
9 Senior Vice President, Corporate Communica-
tions and Corporate Responsibility, member of 
Executive Board and Board of Management 
Traveller 90 min 16 Aug, 2011 
10 Sustainability Researcher Traveller 120 min (not 
recorded, notes 
only) 
17 Nov, 2011 
     
11 Sustainability Manager Cleaner 49min 4 Dec, 2013 
12 Sustainability Manager Builder 44min 4 Dec, 2013 
 Interviews with stakeholders external to case 
organisation  
   
13 Senior inspector Environmental administration 
(ministry) 
72 min 1 Mar, 2011 
14 A member of competition jury, CSR researcher University 110 min 16 Oct, 2012 
15 Expert of sustainability reporting A Big-4 auditing firm (Audit 
company A) 
76min 6 Nov, 2012 
16 Partner, A head of Sustainable Business Solu-
tions 
A Big-4 auditing firm (Audit 
company B) 
60min 8 Nov, 2012 
17 CEO, Investor A private fund management 
company 
63min 29 Nov, 2012 
18 Head of Responsible Investments Insurance company  79min 8 Jan, 2013 
   Total, approx. 
21h 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
  
 33 
 
Table 2. Questionnaire measures on motivating factors and perceived outcomes of CSR* 
 
Question A. To what extent do the following factors motivate your organization to be run as a sustainable 
business and to what extent has your organization obtained the following benefits as a result of sustainable 
business engagement?  
 
Question B. To what extent do the following factors motivate your organization to produce a sustainability 
report and to what extent are the following issues consequences of the sustainability reporting? 
 
*similar survey items offered for both questions A and B. 
 
 
Questionnaire item: Original literature reference: 
Availability of finance and lower cost of capital Cheng et al. (2014), Attig et al. (2013), El Ghoul et al. (2011), 
Eurosif (2012) 
Risk Management Fombrun et al. (2000), Godfrey (2005), Bansal and Clelland 
(2004) 
Availability of finance and lower cost of capital Cheng et al. (2014), Attig et al. (2013), El Ghoul et al. (2011), 
Eurosif (2012) 
Risk Management Fombrun et al. (2000), Godfrey (2005), Bansal and Clelland 
(2004)  
To avoid tighter regulation  Campbell (2006), Bronn & Vidaver-Cohen (2009), Davis (1973)
  
To aid internationalisation of the company’s business   
  
Anderson and Bieniaszewska (2005) 
To follow the example given by markets and competitors Misani 2010, Länsiluoto and Järvenpää (2008) 
To meet the expectations of shareholders Popoli (2011), Porter & Kramer (2006), Hilman & Keim (2001), 
Bansal & Roth (2000) 
To meet requirements of other organizations in the supply chain  PWC (2012), Markley and Davis (2007) 
To increase customer satisfaction Bhattacharya & Sen (2004), Becker-Olsen et al. (2006), Klei & 
Dawar (2004), Rasche and Kell (2010)  
To meet the expectations of civil societies and associations Eesley & Lenox (2006), Pedersen (2010) 
To helps us better managing our corporate image  
 
Branco & Rodrigues (2006), Rasche and Kell (2010), Bronn & 
Vidaver-Cohen (2009), Popoli (2011) 
To create business sustainability solutions/applications Branco & Rodrigues (2006) 
To increase our competitive advantage McWilliams et al. (2006), Branco & Rodrigues (2006), Hart 
(1995) 
To meet stakeholder stipulations Kuisma et al. (2013) 
To enhance our financial performance Orlitzky et al. (2003), Hillman and Keim (2001), Rasche and 
Kell (2010) 
To aligns with the values of the organization Pedersen (2010), Bronn & Vidaver-Cohen (2009) Hahn and  
Scheemesser (2006) 
To increase employee satisfaction Rupp et al. (2006); Branco & Rodrigues (2006, Sims & Keon 
(1997) 
To achieve cost savings Länsiluoto & Järvenpää (2008), Branco & Rodrigues (2006) 
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Table 3. Response Rate Data 
 
500 largest 
other CSR 
reporters 
Sent questionnaires 
in total (N) 
Key responsibility 
area of a 
respondent (N) 
CFOs 500 10   
Missing contact information 4 1   
In total 496 9 505 40 
     
CSR Managers 240 10   
Missing contact information 2 0   
In total 238 10 248 24 
     
Other*    16 
     
Totals 753 80 
Note: Other (16 responses) indicate that the respondents’ key responsibility area is something else than finance or sustainability. 
Even if the public information of the company websites indicate that they are responsible for sustainability issues of the 
organization, the respondents’ key responsibility area however  is business communications, marketing or human resource 
management while sustainability is one part of their primary job. 
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Table 4. Background information: CSR reporters and non-reporters 
 
A key responsibility area of the re-
spondent  
All respondents (n 80) CSR Reporters (n46) Non-reporters (n34) 
Finance 40 13 (28.3%) 27 (79.4%) 
Sustainability/CSR 23 21 (24.7%) 2 (5.9%) 
Sustainability Reporting  1 1 (2.2%) 0 
Other 16 11 (23.9%) 5 (14.7%) 
    
Does your firm have a sustainability 
manager? 
   
Yes, (s)he is a member of a Manage-
ment Board 
8 7 (15.2%) 1 (2.9%) 
Yes, but (s)he is not a member of a 
Management Board 
18 16 (34.8%) 2 (5.9%) 
No 40 16 (34.8%) 24 (70.6%) 
No, but such a post is desirable 4 2 (4.3%) 2 (5.9%) 
No response or missing 10 5 (10.9%) 5 (14.7%) 
    
Number of employees (size)    
Below 50  1 1 (2.2%) 0 (0.0%) 
50-249  9 3 (6.5%) 6 (17.6%) 
250-499  15 7 (15.2%) 8 (23.5%) 
500-999  10 3 (6.5%) 7 (20.6) 
1.000-4.999  27 15 (32.6%) 12 (35.5%) 
More than 5.000  18 17 (37%) 1 (2.9) 
    
Publicly listed on stock exchange 23 18/46 (39.1%) 5/34 (14.7%) 
State-owner is significant 16 7/46 (15.2%) 9/34 (26.5%) 
Has a foreign parent  16 7/46 (15.2%) 9/34 (26.5%) 
Private owners 12 7/46 (15.2%) 5/34 (14.7%) 
    
Type of organization    
Profit oriented company or organiza-
tion 
93,8% 43 (93,5%) 33 (97,1%) 
Non-profit company or organization
  
6,3% 3 (6,5%) 1 (2,9%) 
    
Industry      
Basic industries 8 6 (13,0%) 2 (5,9%) 
Industrial products and services 21 12 (26,1%) 9 (26,5%) 
Consumer products 11 7 (15,2%) 4 (11,8%) 
Other* 34 17 (37%) 17 (50%) 
No response/ missing 6 4 2 
Note: Responses with two or less cases have been integrated into ‘others’. 
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Table 5. Motivations and consequences of CSR among all survey respondents 
Q. To what extent do the following factors motivate your organization to be run as a sustainable business and 
to what extent has your organization obtained the following benefits as a result of sustainable business 
engagement? 
 N* Motivat
ion 
(mean 
on 1-7 
scale) 
Obtained 
consequ
ence 
(mean) 
P value interpretation 
To align with the values of the 
organization  
73 5,85 5,37 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To help us better managing our 
corporate image 
75 5,83 5,33 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To increase customer satisfaction 74 5,69 4,95 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To create business sustainability 
solutions/applications 
74 5,50 4,82 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To meet the expectations of 
shareholders 
76 5,50 5,18 ,005*** Goals not attained 
To increase our competitive 
advantage 
74 5,47 4,72 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To increase employee satisfaction 73 5,45 5,00 ,000*** Goals not attained 
Risk management 73 5,40 5,14 ,004*** Goals not attained 
To meet stakeholder stipulations 73 5,07 4,84 ,093* Goals not attained 
To enhance our financial 
performance 
74 4,78 4,32 ,010** Goals not attained 
To achieve cost savings 73 4,77 4,23 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To meet requirements of other 
organizations in the supply chain 
73 4,74 4,42 ,008*** Goals not attained 
To meet the expectations of civil 
societies and associations 
73 4,29 4,23 ,622 Goals not attained 
To follow the example given by 
markets and competitors 
73 4,51 4,64 ,365 Goals attained 
Availability of finance and lower 
cost of capital 
70 4,16 4,44 ,088* Goals exceeded 
To avoid tighter regulation 71 4,00 3,52 ,007*** Goals not attained 
To aid internationalisation of the 
company’s business 
72 3,56 3,94 ,023** Goals exceeded 
Note: Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-rank test as a nonparametric test, testing bi-directional significance in mean dif-
ferences between “obtained consequence” and “motivation” scores.  
- “obtained consequence” mean score < motivation mean score = Goals not attained 
- “obtained consequence” mean score > motivation mean score  = Goals attained 
- “obtained consequence” mean score > motivation mean score = Goals exceeded 
P value indicates significant result on 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level.  
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Table 6. Motivations and consequences of CSR among CSR reporters and non-reporters 
Q. To what extent do the following factors motivate your organization to be run as a sustainable business and 
to what extent has your organization obtained the following benefits as a result of sustainable business en-
gagement?   
  
Note: Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-rank test as a nonparametric test, testing bi-directional significance in mean dif-
ferences between “obtained consequence” and “motivation” scores.  
- “obtained consequence” mean score < motivation mean score = Goals not attained 
 
N 
Reporting 
Status 
Motivation 
(mean on 
1-7 scale) 
Obtained 
consequence 
(mean) 
P value Interpretation 
To helps us better managing our 
corporate image 
43 
R 
6,16 5,56 ,001*** 
Goals not attained 
 32 NR 5,38 5,03 ,017** Goals not attained 
To increase customer satisfaction 43 R 5,79 5,14 ,000*** Goals not attained 
 31 NR 5,55 4,68 ,000*** Goals not attained 
To meet the expectations of 
shareholders 
43 
R 
5,77 5,44 ,039** 
Goals not attained 
 33 NR 5,15 4,85 ,054* Goals not attained 
To create business sustainability 
solutions/applications 
43 
R 
5,70 5,14 ,000*** 
Goals not attained 
 31 NR 5,23 4,39 ,001*** Goals not attained 
To achieve cost savings 42 R 4,71 4,33 ,037** Goals not attained 
 31 NR 4,84 4,10 ,001*** Goals not attained 
To increase our competitive 
advantage 
42 
R 
5,64 5,00 ,001*** 
Goals not attained 
 
 
32 
NR 
5,25 4,34 ,000*** 
Goals not attained 
Risk Management 42 R 5,52 5,33 ,087* Goals not attained 
 31 NR 5,23 4,87 ,008*** Goals not attained 
To meet stakeholder stipulations 43 R 5,00 5,05 ,868 Goals attained 
 
 
30 
NR 
5,17 4,53 ,006*** 
Goals not attained 
To enhance our financial performance 43 R 4,77 4,35 ,057* Goals not attained 
 31 NR 4,81 4,29 ,093* Goals not attained 
To aligns with the values of the 
organization 
42 
R 
6,26 5,69 ,000*** 
Goals not attained 
 31 NR 5,29 4,94 ,008*** Goals not attained 
To increase employee satisfaction 42 R 5,67 5,29 ,002*** Goals not attained 
 31 NR 5,16 4,61 ,007*** Goals not attained 
To meet requirements of other 
organizations in the supply chain  
42 
R 
4,69 4,48 ,205 
Goals not attained 
 
 
31 
NR 
4,81 4,35 ,006*** 
Goals not attained 
To meet the expectations of civil 
societies and associations 
42 
R 
4,31 4,31 ,967 
Goals attained 
 31 NR 4,26 4,13 ,470 Goals not attained 
To follow the example given by 
markets and competitors 
42 
R 
4,24 4,69 ,045** 
Goals exceeded 
 31 NR 4,87 4,58 ,128 Goals not attained 
Availability of finance and lower cost 
of capital 
39 
R 
4,00 4,46 ,026** 
Goals exceeded 
 31 NR 4,35 4,42 ,772 Goals attained 
To avoid tighter regulation  41 R 3,98 3,59 ,091* Goals not attained 
 30 NR 4,03 3,43 ,021** Goals not attained 
To Aid internationalisation of the 
company’s business    
42 
R 
3,60 3,95 ,034** 
Goals exceeded 
 30 NR 3,50 3,93 ,388 Goals attained 
 38 
 
- “obtained consequence” mean score > motivation mean score  = Goals attained 
- “obtained consequence” mean score > motivation mean score = Goals exceeded 
P value indicates significant result on 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level.  
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Table 7. Motivations and consequences of CSRR 
Q. To what extent do the following factors motivate your organization to produce a CSR report and to what 
extent are the following issues consequences of CSR reporting? 
 N* Motivation 
(mean on 1-
7 scale) 
Obtained 
consequence 
(mean) 
P value Interpretation 
To align with the values of the 
organization  
43 5,48 5,18 ,048** 
Goals not  attained 
To help us better manage our 
corporate image 
44 5,47 4,93 ,006*** 
Goals not attained 
To meet the expectations of 
shareholders  
44 5,33 4,87 ,013** 
Goals not attained 
To increase employee 
satisfaction  
45 4,72 4,26 ,017** 
Goals not attained 
To increase customer 
satisfaction  
44 4,58 4,04 ,004*** 
Goals not attained 
To create business 
sustainability 
solutions/applications 
44 4,33 4,09 
,243 Goals not attained 
To meet stakeholder 
stipulations  
44 4,31 4,16 ,871 
Goals not attained 
To follow the example given by 
markets and competitors 
44 4,27 4,20 ,444 
Goals not attained 
To increase our competitive 
advantage  
44 4,20 3,80 ,025** 
Goals not attained 
Risk management 
 
43 4,14 4,05 
,710 Goals not attained 
To enhance our financial 
performance  
43 3,68 3,36 ,024** 
Goals not attained 
It is easier to reason cost 
saving  
43 3,32 3,30 ,661 
Goals not attained 
Availability of finance and lower 
cost of capital 
43 3,23 3,27 ,772 
Goals attained 
Note: Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-rank test as a nonparametric test, testing bi-directional significance in mean 
differences between “obtained consequence” and “motivation” scores.  
- “obtained consequence” mean score < motivation mean score = Goals not attained 
- “obtained consequence” mean score > motivation mean score  = Goals attained 
- “obtained consequence” mean score > motivation mean score = Goals exceeded 
P value indicates significant result on 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level.  
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Table 8. Effects of CSR on operative control of Early and Late Reporters 
Q. To what extent has corporate responsibility strategy integrated into operative control of your organisation? 
Questionnaire item: Early 
reporters 
Mean 
(N) 
 
Late 
Reporters 
Mean 
(N) 
Mann Whitney 
U-test Sig. 
We have written a sustainability strategy 5,72 
(29) 
5,14 
(14) 
0,354 
Sustainability is included in a 3/5 year plan 5,62 
(29) 
5,14 
(14) 
 
0,285 
Sustainability is included in a business vi-
sion 
6,03 
(29) 
5,57 
(14) 
0,207 
Sustainability is included in a goal setting 
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard) 
5,28 
(29) 
4,64 
(14) 
0,189 
Sustainability has effect on compensation 4,79 
(29) 
4,14 
(14) 
0,273 
Sustainability is written in investment poli-
cy/guidelines 
4,61 
(28) 
3,86 
(14) 
 
0,308 
Sustainability has effect on HR decisions 3,85 
(27) 
4,29 
(14) 
0,257 
 
Note: Mann Whitney U-test Sig. indicates significant result on 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level.  
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Table 9. Effects of CSR on operative control of CSR reporters and non-reporters 
Q. To what extent has corporate responsibility strategy integrated into operative control of your organisation? 
Questionnaire item: CSR reporters 
Mean 
(N) 
 
Non-Reporters 
Mean 
(N) 
Mann Whitney 
U-test Sig. 
We have written a sustainability strategy 5,46 
(46) 
3,56 
(34) 
,000*** 
Sustainability is included in a 3/5 year plan 5,50 
(46) 
3,82 
(34) 
,000*** 
Sustainability is included in a business vi-
sion 
5,87 
(46) 
4,65 
(34) 
,001*** 
Sustainability is included in a goal setting 
(e.g. Balanced Scorecard) 
5,13 
(46) 
3,94 
(34) 
,002*** 
Sustainability has effect on compensation 4,61 
(46) 
3,12 
(34) 
,000*** 
Sustainability is written in investment poli-
cy/guidelines 
4,31 
(45) 
3,21 
(34) 
,002*** 
Sustainability has effect on HR decisions 4,11 
(44) 
3,62 
(34) 
,119 
 
Note: Mann Whitney U-test Sig. indicates significant result on 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level. 
 
 
 
 
